Name the abilities
The strategy reduced to what the enterprise must be able to do.
What a board should see before it is asked to fund a strategy.
US small commercial is one of the largest prizes left in property and casualty: roughly $140 billion in direct premium, about a third of all commercial premium. It is also fragmented, with the largest carrier holding only about 6 percent. Carriers built for large corporate risk look at it and want in.
One global commercial carrier did the strategy work honestly. It concluded that the smallest accounts were won on straight-through processing it did not have, and that competing there would take an acquisition. It chose to compete where it already had standing: small and middle market accounts in broker verticals where it held relationships and product breadth. The target was up to $1 billion in new premium.
Brokers told it what they wanted. One face from the carrier, not one per line of business. A quote and an invoice at the account level. Less to submit, with the carrier finding the rest.
What should a board see before it is asked to fund a strategy?
Market figures: Conning, small commercial market study (2022 data); McKinsey & Company, US small commercial insurance.
The case went to the board in two parts: a proof of concept of about $5 million, and approval to evaluate a target platform, with one option approaching nine figures. The board declined.
The strategy was sound. The investment case was not. By the case’s own account, extending the carrier’s existing architecture had not been tested, and the cost of evaluating the alternatives had not been determined. The board was asked to fund the first step of a program whose size and shape were still unknown.
The carrier already had a multiyear underwriting transformation underway whose scope overlapped the new strategy. It already covered capabilities central to the new strategy and was producing reusable assets.
The board case acknowledged systems that could be reused, but it did not reconcile the strategy’s required capabilities against what the enterprise had already funded. Without that reconciliation, the case could not establish what was genuinely new, what already existed, or what the enterprise risked buying twice.
This test is specific to the carrier. What a strategy requires is the same for anyone who pursues it. What differs is how much of each requirement a carrier already has.
The $5 million was not unreasonable. What it was aimed at was. The proof of concept was designed to test the market proposition and selected features. Much of the experience would be operated manually. It could show whether the proposition attracted interest. It could not prove that the capabilities on which the strategy depended would work at enterprise scale.
The case listed seventeen capabilities it needed, without identifying what already existed, what had to be built, or what required innovation.
Resolved against the Carlson BCM insurance corpus, the strategy embodies roughly eighty business capabilities. Three of them require innovation, and those three make or break the deal.
One carrier, one point of contact, every line the client needs
Lines of business can quote and service as one account without losing product ownership
One quote, one bill, one picture of the client
Policies held in separate systems can be presented as one account without consolidating every system behind it
An address in, a bindable quote out
Third-party data can locate, describe, and assess every insured location with minimal broker input
The three abilities, anonymized and simplified.
The strategy, reduced to what it requires
Any carrier pursuing this strategy needs all three. They are what the $5 million should have proven: each ability validated, taken into an open innovation process, or put through dedicated diligence before the platform is funded.
Derived from the Carlson BCM insurance corpus · Commercial Property and Casualty
The sequence inverts. The work a board would otherwise commission after approval is done before the request reaches it. Name the abilities the strategy depends on. Resolve each against what the enterprise can already do. Publish what remains as a problem statement to third parties, who respond against the capability rather than a vague brief. Test every response through two feasibility checks. Solutions that do not fit fall out before any capital moves.
The strategy reduced to what the enterprise must be able to do.
Each ability set against what is already specified and built.
What remains goes to third parties as a capability problem.
Two checks against the model before any commitment.
A scoped proof and a validated shortlist reach the board.
Prove first, fund second
Before funding the platform, determine what already exists. Before funding the proof, determine what needs to be proven.
The board should receive the results of that work, not be asked to fund the process of discovering them: a proof already scoped, a shortlist already validated, and a clear line between what the enterprise owns and what it must acquire. That is what a board is owed.
The model does not need to author a strategy to test it. It can take one from any firm and show what it depends on before the board pays for it.
A strategy is a claim about what the enterprise will be able to do. Prove the ability, and the program earns its funding. Skip the proof, and the board is asked to buy a hypothesis.